I went to this talk (Wayback Machine here) today. Always exciting to hear from a top official about these things, especially in person.

AI assisted: contains AI generated content.

Claude 3.7 Sonnet helped me organize the rapid notes I took.

What Jake Sullivan said

Disclaimer: none of these are direct quotes. If I noted down something and he didn’t mean it, it’s probably on me or Claude 3.7 Sonnet.

Jake Sullivan served as the U.S. National Security Advisor from 2021 to 2025 under President Biden and recently joined Harvard Kennedy School on April 1 as the inaugural Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order.

During his introduction, Sullivan joked? that being a Jackson School of Global Affairs fellow was the most illustrious part of his career.

He first spent some time crediting the Biden administration for lots of accomplishments, things such as what he described as the destruction of Hamas, slow GDP growth in China, and providing alternatives to the Belt and Road initiative to the rest of the world stating “I firmly believe we left a powerful hand for our successor” - referring to the current Trump administration. He drew comparisons between 2021 and 2025, for example that China’s GDP was no longer projected to surpass the US in 2030, and that more NATO countries were meeting their military spending targets, or are on track to doing so.

And, as the current administration is learning day by day, there are no quick fixes to diplomacy.

Self-Interest and American Foreign Policy

Sullivan spent time trying to debunk zero-sum thinking in foreign policy, describing it as un-American though too prevalent in DC. He advocated for (self) “interest rightfully understood” and positive-sum thinking, which he feels is under pressure from populist narratives suggesting America does too much internationally.

This concept of “self-interest rightfully understood” draws from Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations about American democracy in his famous work “Democracy in America.” De Tocqueville noted that Americans had discovered a way to pursue their individual interests while simultaneously serving the common good - a principle that helped sustain their democratic society.

Examples Sullivan gave of this approach include:

  • Alliances with NATO and Asian partners
  • USAID initiatives
  • Tariffs (which he mentioned as a counterexample)

Sullivan also noted that Americans show support for NATO, Ukraine, and USAID in poll after poll, so he believes that the American people, in general, agree with this idea. However, it is simply that foreign policy is not on people’s minds when they walk into the voting booths.

On China

When asked about China, Sullivan acknowledged the relationship isn’t straightforward. He emphasized that the two nations will have to learn to live by one another and noted deep incentives to work on shared problems, for example around AI’s global impact.

Sullivan seemed proud of the Biden administration’s China policy, suggesting they enhanced America’s strategic position relative to China, including economic trajectories and trade agreements with others. He specifically mentioned the intense diplomacy following tensions in 2023 after the balloon incident and Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, which helped de-escalate tensions, despite the broad media coverage of heightened tensions.

Looking to the future, Sullivan expressed frustration about competition with China, referencing Lee Kuan Yew’s quote that “China could draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, but the United States could draw on the world’s seven billion people,” and wondering if that would continue to be true under the Trump’s administration’s hostile attitude towards foreign students and higher education institutions alike.

Middle East and Iran

On Iran, Sullivan observed that Iran is now indeed weaker than ever. But rather than resort to military force, he believes the weakened projection of power of Iran, together with allies such as the Hezbollah’s decrease of power, there is more internal discussion in Iran about the need to talk, (so now is still the time for statecraft).

Regarding the Hamas conflict, Sullivan described it as a tragedy. noting the harm done to both Israli people during the October 7 Attack, the (to this day) captivity of hostages, as well as the Palestinian people’s lack of access to life-sustaining necessities. He also noted that Israel’s military activity needs to be part of a broader strategy and endgame, which he doesn’t currently see.

War in Ukraine

Sullivan shared that the days leading up to, and following, Russia’s invasion felt like weeks, and weeks felt like months, as his team worked to determine whether they could deter Russian action. When that proved impossible, they pivoted to ensure the war’s outcome wouldn’t be defined by Russia.

The Biden administration’s strategy included declassifying intelligence about Russia’s plans and providing aid to Ukraine. Sullivan noted their approach of sending out information to the world ahead of time that Russia would blame things on Ukraine, watch out.

He mentioned an impulse to want to force Russia to concede, but he argues that people who think this must present a clearer picture of the path that leads to such a result. He notes that direct military conflict with Russia was off the table and suggests that they had exhausted other options. He mentioned that Putin was prepared to endure casualties, economic hardship, loss of geopolitical connections with Europe, while not even achieving his goals in Ukraine, so there was little to do in the face of someone willing to lose so much. Regardless, he said that the Biden administration was able to work hard to ensure Ukraine is put in the best position possible.

Sullivan also touched on the decision to provide cluster munitions (mentioning that 155mm caliber ran out), noting that while there was opposition both inside and outside the government, they were important for Ukraine, despite the potential harm to civilians.

Sullivan said that the Biden administration had 20-or-so-people meetings every day about the Ukraine situation, where they worked hard to come up with and implement ideas that would help Ukraine. Once, he said, a junior military official came up with the idea that, for those countries purchasing some weapon, they should know that Ukraine is now cutting in line ahead of them; that is precisely what they did.

As for the current administration, Sullivan hoped that they can put more pressure on Russia, instead of putting pressure on Ukraine, though the last 24 hours did not seem hopeful in that regard.

AI and Technology Concerns

Sullivan highlighted several AI risks he thinks should feature more prominently in American discourse:

  • Catastrophic cyberattacks
  • AI enabling, say, novel bioweapons
  • Something basic, such as the fusion of AI and nuclear weapons
  • Economic dislocation by AI
  • Disinformation
  • Cohesion of the human society, if everyone has their own AI agents
  • Questions about human reasoning versus AI judgment

Looking Forward

For the future, Sullivan outlined priorities for responsible reform in foreign policy:

  • Strategic manufacturing investments in sectors like cars, batteries, steel, and semiconductors, instead of all manufacturing
  • Working with allies to defend against Chinese overcapacity
  • Protecting American technology advantages
  • Managing AI risks through international collaboration

He suggested this would have been the trajectory of a counterfactual Harris administration, and that even some in the Trump administration might agree with this approach.

Responding to JD Vance’s comments about AI in Munich, Sullivan agreed on protecting America’s advantage but emphasized the need to work with like-minded states and ultimately China to manage AI risks.

Sullivan also expressed concern about America’s allies “de-risking” themselves from the US, in addition to China, as the German chancellor recently said, after being told for four years to work with the US.

Personal Bits

Sullivan credited Yale with teaching him intellectual rigor and thinking skills. He admitted he was a “little sh*t” when he arrived at Yale, very immature, but developed both EQ and IQ there, which helped his diplomatic abilities.

For those interested in a foreign policy career, he suggested the playing field is now “uniquely broad,” concerning AI, economics, trade, and supply chains - areas beyond traditional diplomacy where a Yale education would be valuable. He advised looking for good mentors.

When asked about future plans, Sullivan joked about hoping to be elected as the President of the Congressional Spouses club (but they will never be), referencing his wife’s recent election into the House of Representatives, before acknowledging his new Harvard position.

This event was held at Yale’s Edward P. Evans Hall in the Zhang Auditorium on April 23, 2025, open only to Yale community members.

My Thoughts

Jake Sullivan emphasized the disconnect between the importance of foreign policy, and the relative lack of attention on foreign policy during elections.

He avoided making a lot of comments on Israel and Hamas, which is a very sensitive topic.

He also regretted the Afghanistan retreat, saying that it could have been operationally organized better, but he defended the Biden administration’s decision to end the war that would have dragged on into its 25th year this year otherwise.

The attention on AI risks surprises me, because he was referring to a lot of “general” risks such as making biochemical weapons (wouldn’t textbooks or Organic Chemistry PhDs also teach you how to do that?) and cyberattaks, instead of focusing on specific risks such as, say, being influenced by a different world view that AI models were trained on and inflicts upon its users. He then goes on to talk about existential risks such as cohesion of society, which seems far-fetched from diplomacy, or even reality, or not connected to AI in particular (social withdrawal has been a thing for a while).

He did not criticize the current administration (Trump) directly, perhaps not seeing the need to do so, after outlining the previous one’s achievements?

His voice got smaller and smaller during the final questions about life at Yale, to the extent that we could not hear him clearly without trying very hard.

Joking about how “was once a Yale student” both made him feel old and is also untrue (he was twice a Yale student), he was referred to as “Jake” by the host (until the very end, after he mentioned the Harvard position, at which point the host said “Professor”), demonstrating a laid-back, fireside talk environment. (the SOM was, apparently, not willing to do the “fire” part of the “fireplace chat”). Another moment of humor was when he opened with how national security advisors say their job is complex and demanding, but in his case that was actually true.

He also looked older than in photos, presumably because years of diplomacy takes its toll on people. This video of him talking at UCSD in 2024 is more similar.